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WHAT'S WORSE, NUCLEAR WASTE OR THE UNITED 
STATES' FAILED POLICY FOR ITS DISPOSAL? 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America is a nuclear nation. Despite indi-
viduals and organizations opposed to nuclear energy, 1 the reality 
is that nuclear power is an integral part of our nation and world. 2 
the United States specifically, nuclear power plays a vital role. 
Just less than 20% of the electricity produced in the United 
States comes from nuclear power. 3 Sixty-one commercial nuclear 
power plants operate in thirty states. 4 Furthermore, 
nuclear power is most abundant clean energy source, account-
ing for roughly 60% of the non-fossil fuel electricity generated in 
the United States. 5 Additionally, the United States Navy is built 
around nuclear energy. As of 2009, approximately 45% of the Na-
vy's ships were nuclear powered, with 103 reactors powermg 
eleven aircraft carriers and seventy-one submarines.6 
Whether or not the United States continues to use nuclear 
power into future, the country will be left with the remnants 
1. See generally Karl S. Coplan, The Externalities of Nuclear Power: First, Assume 
We Have a Can Opener ... , 35 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 17 (2008) (arguing that the benefits 
of nuclear power are not worth the long term impacts of nuclear energy production). 
2. See Alex Funk & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Wasted Opportunities: Resolving the Im-
passe in United States Nuclear Waste Policy, 34 ENERGY L.J. 113, 114 (2013) (stating that 
nuclear power accounts for 13.5% of the world's electricity). 
3. Nuclear Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplain 
ed/index.cfm?page=nuclear_home#tab2 (last updated Sept. 8, 2014). 
4. How Many Nuclear Power Plants Are in the United States, and Where Are They 
Located?, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/ 
tools/faqs/faq/cfm?id=207&t=3 (last updated Jan. 22, 2015); see also Nuclear Power in the 
USA, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Count 
ries-T-Z/USA-Nuclear--Power/ (last updated Feb. 2015). 
5. See What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 (last updated June 13, 2014) 
(stating that 67% of electricity in the United States is generated by fossil fuels and 19% by 
nuclear; therefore, nuclear energy accounts for 57% of the remaining 33% of energy not 
generated by fossil fuels). 
6. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE UNITED STATES NAVAL 
NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM 1 (2009). 
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of its past nuclear usage generations to come. After a certain 
period of the uranium fuel inside a nuclear reactor is no 
longer capable of fission. 7 When this point is reached, the reactor 
must be refueled, which involves removing the old uranium-
spent nuclear fuel ("SNF")-and replacing it with new 8 
SNF highly radioactive and can be hazardous to humans for 
tens of thousands of years. 9 There are currently about 72,000 
metric tons of SNF being stored on site at commercial nuclear 
power across the country. 10 However, this figure does not 
the 13,000 metric tons of SNF and other radioactive 
waste generated as a byproduct of the defense industry and the 
custody of the United States Department of Energy ("DOE") at 
various locations around the country. 11 
So, what is the government's plan for all of this highly hazard-
ous nuclear waste? Well, currently there is no real plan. 12 As a re-
sult of overly restrictive legislation and political fighting, the 
United States has been unable to devise a solution to the problem 
of where to safely store the ever-increasing stockpile of nuclear 
waste. 13 The status quo of leaving SNF sitting on-site at nuclear 
power plants raises safety concerns and questions about the abil-
ity to use those locations for some other purpose in the future. 
Critics have raised concerns about SNF stored at power plants 
being susceptible to terrorism and natural disasters. 14 Additional-
under the current scheme, SNF remains in place even after its 
7. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, NUREG/BR-0216, REV. 2, RADIOACTIVE 
WASTE: PRODUCTION, STORAGE, DISPOSAL 7 (2002), available at http://www.nrc.gov/read 
ing-rm/ doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br02 l 6/r2/br02 l 6r2. pdf. 
8. Id. 
9. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 117. 
10. U.S. State by State Used Fuel and Payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund, NUCLEAR 
ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/On-Site-Storage-of 
-Nuclear-Waste/US-State-by-State-Used-Fuel-and-Payments-to-the-Nu (last updated May 
2014). 
11. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-230, DOE NUCLEAR WASTE: 
BETTER INFORMATION NEEDED ON WASTE STORAGE AT DOE SITES AS A RESULT OF YUCCA 
MOUNTAIN SHUTDOWN 1-2, 29 (2011); Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste, U.S. GOV'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/disposal_of_highlevel_nuclear_ 
waste/issue_summary (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
12. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 115 (using the term "Achilles Heel" to de-
scribe the waste disposal problem, which has plagued the nuclear industry for sixty years). 
13. See id. at 115-16. 
14. See Richard B. Stewart & Jane B. Stewart, Solving the Spent Nuclear Fuel Im-
passe, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2014) (indicating that there is a growing concern for 
safety over at-reactor SNF storage). 
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I. THE SNF PROBLEM 
The that led to the current SNF situation is 
political and legal complications. It is, however, 
standing the current condition of the SNF 
summarizing here. 
Nuclear Cycle 
The cycle is a term used to 
industrial processes used to produce electricity from 
nuclear reactor."16 Broken down into three major 
consists first of a "front end," the mining and 
1267 
pre-
many 
to be used as nuclear fuel; second, the 
clear reactor to create electrical energy; and 
a nu-
the ''back end," 
when the SNF is removed the reactor stored 
mate disposal. 17 
During the second part of the nuclear fuel cycle, when the ura-
is being used as fuel an operating neutrons col-
lide with uranium atoms resulting fission-the splitting of the 
15. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
ENERGY 9, 35 (2012) (explaining that SNF left on-site at shutdown power plants prevents 
the land from other economically beneficial uses). 
16. Id. at 9. 
17. Id. 
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uranium atoms. 18 The splitting of a uranium atom creates fission 
fragments, each about half the mass of the original atom, and a 
number of additional neutrons. 19 These neutrons will go on to col-
lide with other uranium atoms, continuing the chain reaction.20 
The splitting of uranium atoms into fission fragments creates ki-
netic energy, which is in turn converted to heat and then electric-
ity. 21 The fission fragments created in the nuclear reaction are 
highly radioactive, and they remain in the SNF after it is re-
moved from the reactor. 22 
When the nuclear fuel can no longer efficiently produce energy, 
it is removed from the reactor. 23 At the point of initial removal 
the reactor, the SNF has a high temperature and emits 
large amounts of radiation; it is therefore considered a High-
Level Waste ("HLW").24 Immediately after coming out of the reac-
tor, SNF is kept in "wet storage" by submerging it in deep, water-
filled pools. 25 The SNF is typically kept in these pools for around 
five years in order to keep it cool and help dissipate the radiation 
it emits. 26 After the SNF has cooled down sufficiently in wet 
storage, it can be safely moved to "dry storage."27 Dry storage is 
typically accomplished by placing the SNF inside casks comprised 
of an inner steel container surrounded by an outer concrete and 
steel container.28 The SNF inside the dry casks can still have rela-
tively high temperatures, but is cooled through natural circula-
tion of 29 
18. See How a Nuclear Reactor Mahes Electricity, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http://www. 
wor Id-nuclear .org/nuclear-basics/how-does-a -nuclear-reactor-make-electricity-/ (last visit-
ed Apr. 3, 2015); Physics of Uranium and Nuclear Energy, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http: 
//www. world-nuclear .org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Introduction/Physics-of-N uclear-Energy/ 
(last updated Sept. 2014). 
19. Physics of Uranium and Nuclear Energy, supra note 18. 
20. Id. 
21. See id. 
22. See id.; BLUE RIBBON CoMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 11. 
23. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 10. 
24. See id. at 10-11; High-Level Waste, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http: 
//www.nrc.gov/waste/high-level-waste.html (last updated Apr. 6, 2012) (identifying SNF as 
one form ofHLW). 
25. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 11. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. See id. 
29. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 27. 
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Early SNF Policy 
Civilian nuclear power was first developed commercially in the 
United States in the 1950s with the understanding that the re-
sulting SNF would be reprocessed for our nation's nuclear weap-
ons program.30 Under this early policy, SNF was only to be stored 
on site at nuclear power plants temporarily until it would be 
transported to reprocessing facilities so that the unused uranium 
and plutonium in the SNF could be separated and reused. 31 How-
ever, even after the reprocessing of SNF, there is still a portion of 
radioactive waste that requires disposal. 32 So, in 1957 the 
Academy of Sciences ("NAS") determined that underground 
burial would be the best solution for HLW disposal. 33 Further-
more, in the 1970s, concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation 
effectively ended the United States' policy of commercial SNF re-
processing. 34 In 1978, with reprocessing of SNF no longer consid-
ered an option, an Interagency Review Group recommended that 
federal government become responsible for the disposal 
commercial SNF and that it be disposed in a geologic repository. 35 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
Subsequent to shifting from a policy that included SNF repro-
cessing to one that was solely focused on geologic burial, Congress 
passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ("NWPA'').36 The 
established that the federal government would take cus-
tody of commercial SNF and required the DOE to recommend at 
least sites for a potential location for a geologic repository 
its indefinite burial. 37 The NWPA also authorized the develop-
ment of "monitored retrievable storage" facilities, which would act 
as centralized locations for the interim storage of SNF while a re-
30. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 117-18; Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, 
at 8-9. 
31. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 118. 
32. Id. at 140. 
33. Debra J. Carfora, Building a Sustainable Energy Future: Offering a Solution to the 
Nuclear Waste Disposal Problem Through Reprocessing and the Rebirth of Yucca Moun-
tain, 8 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGYL. 143, 153 (2012). 
34. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9. 
35. Carfora, supra note 33, at 153; Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 119. 
36. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2012). 
37. Carfora, supra note 33, at 154. 
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constructed.38 Until a geologic repository or 
was developed, electric utilities were 
SNF on-site at nuclear power plants.39 
encountered significant political resistance from local 
its efforts to choose locations a geologic reposi-
storage facilities. 43 Therefore, in or-
establishing those locations, Con-
1987.44 These amendments to the 
sole candidate for a SNF geologic re-
U nited States would be located at Yucca Mountain 
an effort to ensure that a repository 
established, the 1987 NWPA amendments also 
from constructing any consolidated interim 
storage facility commercial SNF until a license has been 
granted for the geologic repository. 46 
about ninety miles northwest of Las 
legally possible site for a commercial 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 10161; see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120. 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 10151; see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120. 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(c); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121. 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(B); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121. 
43. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9. 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 10172(b); see also Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9. 
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a); Carfora, supra note 33, at 155. 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10165(b), 10168(d)(l); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120; 
Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 67 (explaining that the restrictions that the 1987 
amendments to the NWP A placed on consolidated interim storage facilities were based on 
a concern that their establishment would undermine the development of a geologic reposi-
tory). 
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SNF 
'"stable geologic 
site, 
determined 
~uun~i, to be disturbed 
a 
se1sm1c 
or forces."48 
Since passage Yucca Mountain been ex-
tensively studied United States' SNF 
49 The has assessed Yucca 
for a geologic repository."50 So, 
UUHVH studying of 
~,,,..,,,~·~ the Yucca Development Act 
law, which began the licensing process Yucca Mountain as a 
SNF geologic 51 
The opposed to 
since passage of the 
~~-~"'""~""to submitting a "Notice 
to Congress the passage the 53 the 
Resources Defense Council, the 
clear Energy thirteen lawsuits in an 
prevent repository from moving forward. 54 Their efforts 
not completely Yucca did result consider-
able delay. In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals the 
District that, in evaluating radiation protection, 
a 1,000,000-year safety standard should have been used-based 
on NAS findings-instead of the 10,000-year safety standard 
47. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 121-22. This includes the excavation of "a five mile tunnel through the 
mountain to function as an Exploratory Study Facility." Id. at 122. 
50. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/RW-
0508, VIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF A REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, OVERVIEW 2 (1998). 
51. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 157; Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 124. 
52. See Joseph A Cohen, What to Do with America's Nuclear Defense Waste: The Han-
ford Effect, 6 KY. ,J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 8-9 (2014) (stating that the 
1987 NWPA, dubbed the "Screw Nevada bill," has seen significant local resistance); Stew-
art & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9 (noting Nevada's resistance to the Yucca Mountain pro-
ject). 
53. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 123. 
54. Carfora, supra note 33, at 157. 
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was used. 55 Therefore, four additional years of research were re-
by the Environmental Protection Agency to comply with 
h , i· 56 t e courts ruing. 
2008, after twenty years and $12 billion to establish Yucca 
Mountain as the repository location, the DOE submitted a licens-
ing application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") to 
begin the three-year licensing process. 57 But, in 2009, with the 
start of the Obama administration, came a shift in policy against 
Yucca Mountain. 58 First, President Obama requested that Con-
gress discontinue funding the Yucca Mountain project in an at-
tempt to stop its progress. 59 The next year, in 2010, the DOE filed 
a motion to withdraw the Yucca Mountain licensing application 
prejudice, meaning that the application could never be re-
filed. 60 Although the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
denied the DOE's petition to withdraw the Yucca Mountain appli-
cation,61 the licensing proceeding was nonetheless suspended. 62 
States and municipalities that are home to nuclear power plants 
brought legal action before the NRC and D.C. Circuit to 
force the NRC to continue with the licensing procedure.63 As a re-
sult, in August 2013, the D.C. Circuit issued mandamus requiring 
the NRC to process the Yucca Mountain licensing application. 64 
The NRC has since resumed licensing proceedings. 65 
E. Recent Litigation 
addition to political and legal issues surrounding the estab-
a geologic repository for SNF, there has also been re-
55. See Nuclear Energy Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1267, 1273 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004). 
56. Carfora, supra note 33, at 158. 
57. Cohen, supra note 52, at 9. 
58. See id. According to Cohen, the policy shift against Yucca Mountain was a political 
decision by President Obama, influenced by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-
N evada) and tied to a campaign promise Obama made in the 2008 presidential election. 
Id. at 9-10. 
59. Carfora, supra note 33, at 159. 
60. Id.; In re U.S. Dep't of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), 71 N.R.C. 609, 615-
16, 2010 WL 91054 79 at *5 (N.R.C. 2010). 
61. In re U.S. Dep't of Energy, 71 N.R.C. at 629. 
62. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 13. 
63. Carfora, supra note 33, at 159. 
64. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
65. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 14. 
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In November 2013, the D.C. Circuit held that "[b]ecause 
Secretary [of Energy] is apparently unable to conduct a legally 
adequate fee assessment, the Secretary is ordered to to 
Congress a proposal to change the fee to zero."66 This has effec-
tively stopped the DOE from collecting money for the NWF. 67 
The uncertainty surrounding the Yucca Mountain SNF reposi-
tory has also led to problems with the licensing of nuclear power 
plants. After multiple states filed suit regarding the licensing 
nuclear power plants, the D.C. Circuit suspended the licensing 
process because the NRC had not adequately addressed the pos-
sibility of leaks or fires occurring in SNF storage pools, nor it 
considered the possibility that a geologic repository might never 
be built.68 However, in September 2014, the NRC issued a new 
"Waste Confidence Rule" which addressed the court's concerns.69 
This has led the NRC to resume issuing licenses for commercial 
nuclear power plants. 70 However, despite the NRC's new Waste 
Confidence Rule, recent petitions have been filed to again 
the licensing and relicensing of nuclear power plants. 71 With this 
continued litigation, it appears that there will not be any resolu-
tion to the SNF problem soon. 
66. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 736 F.3d 517, 521 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). 
67. See Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 4 n.3. 
68. New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 681F.3d471, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
69. Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,238 (Sept. 19, 2014) (to 
be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51); see also Sonal Patel, NRC Issues Final Rule to Replace 
Waste Confidence Decision, Ends Licensing Suspension, POWER (Aug. 26, 2014), http:// 
www.powermag.com/nrc-issues-final-rule-to-replace-waste-confidence-decision-ends-licens 
ing-suspension/. This new waste confidence rule concludes that SNF can be safely stored 
on-site at nuclear power plants indefinitely. Id. 
70. Nancy Slater-Thompson, NRC Resumes License Renewals for Nuclear Power 
Plants, PENNENERGY (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/20 
14/10/nrc-resumes-license-renewals-for-nuclear-power-plants.html. 
71. See Danielle Killey, Tribe Appeals NRC's Waste Storage Rule30, REPUBLICAN 
EAGLE (Oct. 31, 2014, 5:07 PM), http://www.republican-eagle.com/content/tribe-appeals-
nrcs-waste-storage-rule30; Activists File Petition to Stop Licensing of U.S. Nuclear Plants, 
LONGVIEW NEWS-JOURNAL (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.news-journal.com/news/nation/ac 
tivists-file-petition-to-stop-licensing-ofu-s-nuclear-plants/ article_ 42987 d 7f-f0e4-54c6-8c07-
d3a90beba077 .html. 
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72. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 116; see also Carfora, supra note 33, at 159 (de-
scribing how the Blue Ribbon Commission was part of the President's plan to terminate 
the Yucca Mountain project). 
73. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at vii; Cohen, 
supra note 52, at 10-11. 
7 4. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at vii-viii. 
75. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED 
NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 1 (2013) [hereinafter DOE 
STRATEGY], available at http://www.energy.gov/downloads/strategy-management-and-
disposal-used-nuclear-fuel-and-high-level-radioactive-waste; Cohen, supra note 52, at 11-
12. 
76. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 12. 
77. See DOE STRATEGY, supra note 75. 
78. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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Despite 
disposal. 
pository locations. 
amount of time required to establish a ~~· .... ~ ... re100Entc>rv 
more intermediate storage 
temporary storage of our country's ,_,v,.uu.u::;;.1. 
79. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 140 ("[R]eprocessing does not eliminate the dis-
posal issue. Reprocessing still generates a significant volume of highly radioactive 
waste."). 
80. Carfora, supra note 33, at 163-64. Some of the locations that have been considered 
for SNF disposal include outer space, ocean bottom, and within the polar ice. Id. at 163. 
Unfortunately, launching SNF into space is considered too dangerous because of the risk 
of nuclear contaminated debris being sprinkled across the globe in the event of a rocket 
malfunction. Id. Similarly, international agreements ban the disposal of SNF at sea or 
within polar ice sheets. Id. at 163-64. 
81. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35 ("The 
Commission concludes that there are several compelling reasons to move as quickly as 
possible to develop safe, consolidated storage capacity on a regional or national basis."). 
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1. Geologic Repository 
As part of the solution to the SNF problem, the United States 
should continue to move towards establishing geologic reposito-
ries for the eventual permanent disposal of SNF. This plan should 
include, but not be completely dependent on, Yucca Mountain 
a repository location. 
SNF requires disposal because it contains a large concentration 
of unstable isotopes that undergo radioactive decay and in doing 
so emit high levels of radiation. 82 Exposure to the radiation from 
SNF can be dangerous to humans because the radiation has the 
ability to alter the molecular structure of tissue. 83 The that 
results from radiation exposure can lead to cancer, genetic de-
fects, and death. 84 Because of the extremely long half-lives 
some of the radioactive isotopes in SNF, it can remain hazardous 
thousands of years. 85 Therefore, as the Blue Ribbon Commis-
sion stated in its report, "deep geological disposal is the most 
promising and accepted method currently available for safely iso-
lating [SNF] and high-level radioactive wastes from the 
ment for very long periods of time."86 
The development of a repository at Yucca Mountain is 
at an impasse.87 Furthermore, the Obama administration no 
intention of going forward with the Yucca Mountain project. 88 
However, completely abandoning Yucca Mountain would be a 
mistake.89 
Yucca Mountain is a prime location to develop an SNF reposi-
tory.90 As stated to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works: 
82. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON A:M.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 12. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 14. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 29. 
87. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text. 
88. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 159, 162 (discussing how, under the Obama admin-
istration, the Department of Energy attempted to withdraw the licensing application for 
Yucca Mountain, and the Blue Ribbon Commission made no recommendations for Yucca 
Mountain). 
89. Id. at 168 ("[P]olicymakers should move forward with Yucca Mountain."). 
90. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, 109th Cong., YUCCA MOUNTAIN: THE 
MOST STUDIED REAL ESTATE ON THE PLANET 23 (2006). 
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YUCCA MOUNTAIN: THE 
2015] NUCLEAR WASTE 
More is known about Yucca Mountain than any other parcel of real 
estate on the planet .... It has been confirmed in the laboratory, re-
viewed by independent experts, and validated against information 
from analogous sites around the world .... There is certainlJ; no rea-
son in science not to move forward directly with this project. 1 
1277 
This has been determined after investing more than three dec-
ades and billions of dollars into researching Yucca Mountain. 92 
However, the Obama administration has decided to the 
brakes on Yucca Mountain, not because of any technical or safety 
issues, but rather solely for policy reasons. 93 But despite the ad-
ministration's policy shift against Yucca Mountain, the amount 
research, time, and money that has already been invested 
developing the repository makes the abandonment of Yucca 
Mountain the wrong decision. 94 Otherwise, the last three decades 
of SNF policy will have "left the country with no waste disposal 
solution in sight and taxpayers with a $10 billion bill for a tunnel 
the middle of the desert that leads nowhere."95 
Deciding to keep Yucca Mountain as part of the United States' 
SNF plan is easier said than done. The "not-in-my-backyard" poli-
tics that have all but terminated Yucca Mountain are not likely to 
go away. 96 However, it is possible that a compromise could 
made to prevent a complete loss of the investment that the Unit-
ed States taxpayers have made in Yucca Mountain. Even if it is 
not used as a repository for SNF, Yucca Mountain could still po-
tentially be developed as a repository for low-level radioactive 
waste. 97 The United States should keep Yucca Mountain as part 
of the solution to the SNF problem, even if it is not as a perma-
nent SNF repository. 
91. Id. 
92. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-229, COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE: 
EFFECTS OF A TERMINATION OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY PROGRAM A..l\JD LESSONS 
LEARNED 10 (2011) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE]. 
93. Id. at 11. 
94. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 167-68. 
95. Id. at 166 . 
96. See id. at 150 (describing how "not-in-my-backyard" politics have prevented Yucca 
Mountain from coming to fruition); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 144 (rec-
ommending that the current Yucca Mountain project be set aside due to local political op-
position). 
97. Aaron Szabo, Reprocessing: The Future of Nuclear Waste, 29 TEMP. J. Ser. TECH. & 
ENVTL. L. 231, 234, 241 (2010). 
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never ma-
still be some 
Storage 
a permanent geological re-
established any time soon, 103 mean-
98. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 8. 
99. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 143. 
100. Id. at 144 ("The current stockpile of commercial and defense nuclear waste des-
tined for Yucca Mountain already exceeds [the capacity of Yucca Mountain], and the 
amount of waste continues to increase."). 
101. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 48. 
102. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 92, at 10. 
103. The Government Accountability Office has estimated that even if the licensing 
process for Yucca Mountain were to resume, it would still take until at least 2027 before it 
would be open as a repository. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-797, SPENT 
NUCLEAR FUEL: ACCUMULATING QUANTITIES AT COivIMERCIAL REACTORS PRESENT 
STORAGE AND OTHER CHALLENGES 23 (2012). It has also been estimated that a new reposi-
tory could take up to forty years to develop. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 145. 
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104. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-15-141, SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
MANAGEMENT: OUTREACH NEEDED TO HELP GAIN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE FOR FEDERAL 
ACTIVITIES THAT ADDRESS LIABILITY 1 (2014) [hereinafter SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
MANAGEMENT]. 
105. Id. at 11. 
106. This is probably a bad assumption considering the United States currently gets 
about twenty percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Nuclear Explained, supra note 
3. 
107. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 104, at 14. 
108. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35-36 (noting 
that as of January 2012 ten plants-Big Rock Point (Michigan), Haddam Neck (Connecti-
cut), Hamboldt Bay (California), LaCrosse (Wisconsin), Maine Yankee (Maine), Rancho 
Seco (California), Trojan (Oregon), Yankee Rowe (Massachusetts), Zion 1 & 2 (Illinois), 
and Fort St. Vrain (Colorado)-all contain stranded SNF. Additionally, Vermont Yankee 
shut down in December 2014, creating the newest stranded SNF. See Zoe Schlanger, Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant Just Shut Down; U.S. Still Has No System for Dispos-
ing of Nuclear Waste, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.newsweek.comJvermont-
yankee-nuclear-plant-just-shut-down-us-still-has-no-system-disposing-295775. 
109. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35. 
110. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 57. 
111. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35. 
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for the singular purpose of holding SNF. 112 This can be particular-
ly burdensome considering the fact that the site is no gen-
erating any revenue from electricity production to offset those 
costs. 113 
The other challenge unique to stranded SNF is that it prevents 
the site from being used for some other purpose. 114 The local com-
munity is forced to deal with the fact that the stranded SNF is 
there and the land that it sits on cannot be to some more pro-
ductive use. 115 This can be especially aggravating for the commu-
nity because they never consented to the SNF being stored indef-
initely nor do they receive any benefits for hosting this 
material. 116 
All SNF, but stranded SNF in particular, would be much better 
suited if it were moved from the several sites where it is currently 
located to one or more consolidated interim storage facilities 
while a geologic repository is being constructed. 117 Consolidated 
interim storage of SNF also has the support of the and the 
Blue Ribbon Commission. 118 There are major benefits of moving 
the commercial SNF to a consolidated interim storage 
terim storage facilities are considered safer more cost effec-
tive than on-site storage and would allow the to meet its ob-
ligation of taking custody of the commercial sooner than it 
would if it had to wait for a permanent geologic repository. 119 
The federal government contends that the current 
storing SNF on site at commercial nuclear power 
In fact, in September 2014, the NRC issued a new 
system of 
is safe. 120 
adopting 
112. See id. ("[T]he operation and maintenance costs for spent fuel storage at shutdown 
sites range from $4.5 million to $8 million per year, compared to an incremental $1 million 
per year or less when the reactor is still in operation."). 
113. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 57. 
114. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35. 
115. Id. 
116. See id. (discussing the impact of spent fuel on communities in the area). 
117. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 144 (advocating the simultaneous develop-
ment of ''both centralized interim storage and permanent geological disposal facilities"); 
see also Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 59 ("[T]he considerations invoked by BRC 
and the Hamal Report also justify development of consolidated storage facilities for SNF 
that now resides at reactor sites."). 
118. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35; DOE 
STRATEGY, supra note 75, at 2. 
119. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 138. 
120. See Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 10-11. 
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findings from a generic environmental impact statement 
("GEIS"). 121 GEIS evaluated the safety of storing SNF on site 
at nuclear power plants over three separate timeframes: short-
term (sixty years beyond licensed life of the reactor), long-term 
(100 years beyond the licensed life of the reactor), and indefinite 
storage (assuming no geologic repository ever becomes availa-
ble).122 The GEIS concluded that commercial SNF can be safely 
stored at reactor sites indefinitely. 123 However, despite the gov-
ernment's confidence that SNF can be safely stored on-site at 
power the Fukushima incident 2011 has led some to 
question how safe that policy actually is. 124 Multiple consolidated 
interim storage facilities for SNF could help protect the United 
States against a Fukushima-like disaster. 125 By having consoli-
dated interim storage facilities that include wet storage, SNF 
could be moved from pools at nuclear power plant sites the 
event of an emergency requiring those pools to be cleared. 126 
Besides safety concerns, proponents of consolidated interim 
storage for commercial SNF argue that those facilities can 
"achieve significant scale economies in operating and maintaining 
security, yielding very significant operating cost savings relative 
to the costs of providing security for the numerous storage facili-
ties at nuclear power plants dispersed across the country."127 The-
se cost savings will be most significant for the country's stranded 
SNF, where the cost for storage ranges from $4.5 million to $8 
million per year. 128 According to the Blue Ribbon Commission, the 
121. Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,238 (Sept. 19, 2014) (to 
be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
122. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, NUREG-2157, GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR CONTINUED STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, at xxx fig.ES-1 
(2014) [hereinafter GEIS], available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1419/ML14196A 
105.pdf. 
123. Patel, supra note 69. See generally GEIS, supra note 122, at xlvii-xlviii tbLES-3 
(indicating that even with indefinite at-reactor storage of commercial SNF, environmental 
impacts would be generally small for all of the study's resource areas). 
124. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 136; see also Stewart & Stewart, supra note 
14, at 29. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex was struck by an earthquake 
and tsunami that caused significant damage. Id. at 24. The most serious problems at Fu-
kushima involved the SNF located in cooling pools that experienced cooling system fail-
ures due to the loss of electrical power. Id. at 24-25. This dangerous condition can lead to 
a release of radiation. Id. 
125. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 37-38. 
126. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 49. 
127. Id. at 52. 
128. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35. 
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savings associated with moving the stranded SNF to a consoli-
dated interim storage facility would be enough to pay for that fa-
·i·t 129 Cl l y. 
Establishing one or more consolidated interim storage facilities 
would also allow the federal government to begin meeting its 
waste acceptance obligations sooner than it otherwise would if it 
for a geologic repository. 130 Pursuant to the NWPA, the 
entered Standard Contracts with for the re-
moval of SNF their reactor sites starting in 1998. 131 re-
turn for the government taking custody of the SNF, the 
utilities have made annual contributions to the NWF, which 
would finance the eventual disposal the SNF. 132 The fee that 
utilities pay was initially set at 1 (0.1 cents) per kilowatt-
of nuclear electricity produced.133 The NWF currently has an 
unspent balance of $27 billion. 134 
However, due to the delays in establishing a geologic repository 
at Yucca Mountain, the federal government has not yet taken 
custody of any commercial SNF. 135 As of March 2014, over ninety 
lawsuits have been filed against the DOE for this breach of con-
tract.136 2012, the federal government had paid $2 billion in 
damages as a result. of these lawsuits. 137 The DOE estimates that 
its future liability will be $21.4 billion through 2071.138 
Congressional budget rules have resulted in the NWF money 
becoming essentially inaccessible. 139 As a result, the damages that 
the federal government has been paying to the utilities for its 
breach of contract do not come from the NWF; instead, they come 
the federal Judgment Fund. 140 "Because payments from the 
129. Id. 
130. See id. at 36 ("Developing consolidated storage capacity would enable the U.S. 
government to begin fulfilling its legal obligations ... with respect to the acceptance and 
removal of SNF from commercial reactor sites."). 
131. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120-21; see supra Part LC. 
132. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120-21; see supra Part LC. 
133. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 70. 
134. Id. at 71. 
135. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121. 
136. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 104, at 2. 
137. Schlanger, supra µote 108. 
138. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 104, at 2. 
139. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 72. 
140. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 102. 
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clear power 
storage 
adding unneeded ~~~L-,,~,,~, 
an interim storage facility 
years to develop at a cost ranging 
significant time associated establishing a system 
consolidated storage is precisely 
should act now to a system as 
to SNF problem. not 
Yucca Mountain basket, rather allowed an SNF 
tern that interim storage, the United States 
facing this problem today. Therefore, "[f]rom the 
SNF safety and costs, it would be desirable to 
operating reactors as as from decommissioned 
consolidated storage sooner rather than later."146 
3. Choosing Intermediate Storage Repository Locations 
order to a plan for SNF that includes a "'""''"m 
145 
at a non-Yucca Mountain location and consolidated interim stor-
age, the NWP A will have to repealed or an.1cu.uc;•Ll. 
as amended in 1987, prohibits the construction 
141. Id. at 20, 102. 
142. See BLUE RIBBON CoMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 36--37. 
143. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 138. 
144. Id. 
145. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-731T, NUCLEAR WASTE: DISPOSAL 
CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM YUCCA MOUNTAIN 12 (2011). 
146. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 59-60. 
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storage facility until a geological repository is licensed.147 Addi-
tionally, by law, Yucca Mountain is the only site that can be con-
sidered for a geologic repository. 148 Therefore, Congress must 
amend or repeal the NWPA to clear the way for the implementa-
tion of a workable SNF plan that includes developing a non-Yucca 
Mountain geologic repository and a consolidated interim storage 
facility. 149 
In changing the NWPA to restructure the United States' ap-
proach to managing SNF, policymakers should adopt a consent-
based approach to finding locations for a new geologic repository 
and one or more consolidated interim storage facilities. 150 Yucca 
Mountain has not worked as a geologic repository site because the 
project has been driven solely by politicians in Washington, D.C., 
has not had the support of the local community. 151 Given this 
opposition, "[t]he federal government must accordingly abandon 
'top-down' prescriptions embraced in NWPA and its 1987 
amendments, and the dysfunctional approach to their implemen-
tation."152 It is a positive sign that the Blue Ribbon Commission 
and the DOE both support a consent-based approach for deter-
mining future SNF storage and repository locations. 153 
In using a consent-based approach to establish future SNF 
storage and repository sites, the federal government should tie 
economic incentives to localities that are willing to host a consoli-
dated interim storage facility or geologic repository. 154 A vigorous 
incentive package is also something that the Blue Ribbon Com-
mission identified as necessary in finding suitable locations for 
SNF disposal. 155 Specifically, the United States' SNF plan should 
147. Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, sec. 5021, § 
148(d)(l), 101 Stat. 1330-227, 1330-236 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 10168 (2012)). 
148. Sec. 5011, §160, 101 Stat. 227, 228. 
149. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 146-47. 
150. See id. at 145. 
151. See, e.g., id. at 123-24 (describing how Nevada submitted a formal Notice of Dis-
approval in response to President Bush's approval of the Yucca Mountain repository and 
subsequently filed multiple lawsuits after Congress and the President overrode Nevada's 
disapproval). 
152. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 75. 
153. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 47; DOE 
STRATEGY, supra note 75, at 1-2. 
154. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 145. 
155. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 58-59. 
2015] 
tie storage and re 
plementation of S 
B. SNF Reproces. 
Nuclear power 
would be extreme 
not continue to gr 
Therefore, the U 
million-year solui 
repository-when 
be part of the m 
United States she 
SNF instead of 
a nuclea: 
er efficiently ma: 
must be either d 
fact that the 
actor, the SNF sti 
be used for fissim 
unused uranium J 
fuel in the futuri 
1 . 161 b ent y exists, t 
SNF reprocessini 
156. The Blue Ribbm 
[with] research and den 
courage establishing a C( 
157. Stewart & Stew: 
158. Decommissionin 
See Backgrounder on De 
COMM'N, available at h 
sioning.html (last updat 
power plants can be re 
REGULATORY COMM'N, Sl 
159. See Recycling [ 
tions-1092/areva-la-hagi 
95% of the SNF remove 
cled). 
160. Fuel Reprocessii 
nrc.Gov/reading-rm/basi 
18, 2015). 
161. See Carfora, su1 
dom, Russia, India, and 
162. See Szabo, supr, 
~w [Vol. 49:1265 
licensed. 14 7 Addi-
~ that can be con-
' Congress must 
· the implementa-
1ping a non -Yucca 
d interim storage 
fnited States' ap-
adopt a consent-
eologic repository 
~acilities. 150 Yucca 
y site because the 
Vashington, D.C., 
nity. 151 Given this 
)rdingly abandon 
PA and its 1987 
, their implemen-
)bon Commission 
proach for deter-
153 )nS. 
llish future SNF 
:iment should tie 
to host a consoli-
154 A . 
. ory. vigorous 
lue Ribbon Com-
:i.ble locations for 
SNF plan should 
ro. 100-203, sec. 5021, § 
: U.S.C. 10168 (2012)). 
a formal Notice of Dis-
[ountain repository and 
dent overrode Nevada's 
1ra note 15, at 47; DOE 
·a note 15, at 58-59. 
2015] NUCLEAR WASTE 1285 
tie storage and repository sites to research, development, and im-
plementation of SNF reprocessing. 156 
SNF Reprocessing 
Nuclear power technology has only existed for sixty years. 157 It 
be extremely shortsighted to think that this technology will 
not continue to grow through advances in science and innovation. 
Therefore, the Unites States should not focus exclusively on a 
million-year solution to the SNF problem-burial in a geologic 
repository-when emerging technology, such as reprocessing, can 
of the answer. In order to solve its SNF problem, the 
United States should change its policy to include the reprocessing 
instead of solely focusing on permanent disposal. 
When a nuclear reactor reaches the point where it can no long-
er efficiently maintain its chain reaction to produce energy, it 
must be either decommissioned or refueled. 158 However, despite 
fact that the SNF can no longer be used efficiently in the re-
actor, the SNF still contains a large quantity of uranium that can 
be used for fission. 159 Reprocessing is the process of removing the 
unused uranium from the SNF so that it can be reused as nuclear 
in the future. 160 Even though reprocessing technology pres-
ently exists, 161 the United States currently has no commercial 
SNF reprocessing plants. 162 However, by implementing repro-
156. The Blue Ribbon Commission recommends that a potential host site be "co-located 
[with] research and demonstration facilities" but does not go far enough to explicitly en-
courage establishing a commercial SNF reprocessing program. Id. at 59. 
157. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 8-9. 
158. Decommissioning is the process of removing a nuclear power plant from service. 
See Backgrounder on Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM'N, available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/decommis 
sioning.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2014). As an alternative to decommissioning, nuclear 
power plants can be refueled by replacing the SNF with fresh fuel. See U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 7, at 7. 
159. See Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, AREVA, http://www.areva.com/EN/opera 
tions-1092/areva-la-hague-recycling-used-fuel.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (stating that 
95% of the SNF removed from commercial nuclear reactors is uranium that can be recy-
cled). 
160. Fuel Reprocessing (Recycling), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www. 
nrc.Gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fuel-reprocessing-recycling,html (last updated Feb. 
18, 2015). 
161. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169 (stating that France, Japan, the United King-
dom, Russia, India, and China have all instituted SNF reprocessing programs). 
162. See Szabo, supra note 97, at 236 (stating that the only U.S. commercial SNF re-
!II'• 
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the to the SNF problem, the United 
able to take advantage of increased efficiency its 
power plants at the same time minimizing the vol-
ume of SNF that will permanent disposal. 163 
1. SNF Reprocessing in the United States 
reprocessing technology has existed since the early 1940s 
it was used the United States for development of nu-
weapons.164 Reprocessing continued purposes 
time the Cold War, the objec-
tive greater numbers nuclear weapons and develop-
nuclear weapon technology. 165 The only com-
the United States operated in 
1976, it down 
1 . 166 regu atory reqmrements. 
policy changes from nuclear 
concerns, President Carter indefinitely de-
reprocessing of SNF. 167 However, in 1981, 
President Reagan lifted the on commercial SNF reprocessing, 
stating government had "failed in meeting its responsi-
to industry to an acceptable system for 
waste disposal" that he was "lifting the indefinite 
administrations placed on commercial repro-
United States."168 However, despite the 
processing plant operated in West Valley, New York, for six years starting in 1966). 
163. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169-70. 
164. Szabo, supra note 97, at 235. 
165. Id. at 235-36. 
166. Id. at 236; West Valley Demonstration Project Nuclear Timeline, U.S. DEP'T OF 
ENERGY W. VALLEY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT, http://www.wv.doe.gov/Site_History.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
167. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 20. President 
Carter stated that "a serious risk is involved in the handling of nuclear fuels-the risk 
that component parts of this power process will be turned to providing explosives or atom-
ic weapons" and that the United States would "defer indefinitely the commercial repro-
cessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in U.S. nuclear power programs." Nuclear 
Power Policy: Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on Decisions 
Following a Review of U.S. Policy, 1 PUR PAPERS 581, 582 (Apr. 7, 1977). 
168. Statement Announcing a Series of Policy Initiatives on Nuclear Energy, PUB. 
PAPERS 903, 904 (Oct. 8, 1981). 
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Despite the current of not 
United States change that and 
processing as a of solution to the SNF disposal 
Reprocessing SNF provides more efficient use of our 
sources and the amount SNF must 
of in a geological 173 
fuel is only used m a reactor once-meaning it is 
never reprocessed-then only about 5% of available energy 
from the is actually consumed. 174 Ninety-five percent the 
SNF is unused and 1 % is 175 The and 
plutonium-energy materials-can be physically separated from 
4% of the SNF is waste. 176 Once separated from the 
waste, energy materials can recycled them into 
169. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON Alv!:.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 20. 
170. DOE STRATEGY, supra note 75, at 1. 
171. See id. at 8. 
172. See id. at 7, 10. 
173. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169-70. 
174. Id. at 169. 
175. Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, AREVA, http://www.areva.com/EN/operations· 
1092/areva-la-hague-recycling-used-fuel.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
176. Id. 
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Office 
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177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 140. 
181. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 170; see also Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, 
supra note 175 ("Thanks to recycling and vitrification, the volume of highly radioactive 
waste is reduced fivefold."). 
182. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 171-72. 
183. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 141. 
184. Id. (citing Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly Disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 
llOth Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Of-
fice)). 
185. Szabo, supra note 97, at 247. "With the significant costs of building a reprocessing 
plant, the cost of reprocessing spent fuel would need to be significantly less than the cost 
of mining, fabricating and storing new nuclear fuel." Id. at 246-47. 
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b. 
186. Id. at 247. 
187. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 168-69 ("Removing the heated short-lived compo-
nents of the SNF could reduce the amount of space needed in the repository by eliminating 
the large gaps between casks."). See generally Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly Dis-
posing of Spent Nuclear Fuel, llOth Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Direc-
tor, Congressional Budget Office) ("Policymakers weighing the merits of reprocessing and 
direct disposal may have other concerns besides cost-such as extending U.S. uranium 
resources ... or lessening the demand for long-term storage space. Judging whether those 
goals justify the added costs of reprocessing is ultimately a decision for policymakers."). 
188. RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND CONTAMINATED SITE CLEAN-UP, 
PROCESSES, TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 148 (William E. Lee, et al. 
eds., 2013) ("A de facto moratorium was placed on reprocessing of commercial spent nucle-
ar fuel in the US in 1977; this ban was lifted in 1981 .... "); Carfora, supra note 33, at 172 
(''Many critics oppose reprocessing on grounds that it could lead to nuclear weapons prolif-
eration."); BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 20 (stating 
that the presidential directive deferring commercial reprocessing of SNF was in response 
to concerns of nuclear weapons proliferation). 
189. Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, supra note 175. 
1290 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW 49:1265 
190. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 141. 
191. Id. at 141-42. 
192. Carfora, supra note 33, at 172. 
193. Id. 
194. See id. (indicating that it would be economically impractical to remove the fuel 
rods during the right time frame to create weapons grade plutonium). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 173. 
200. Szabo, supra note 97, at 238; see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 140. 
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and development. 205 By tying disposal and storage locations with 
reprocessing, the United States could more easily implement a 
multifaceted approach to solving the SNF problem. 
The last three decades of failed SNF policy prove that a singu-
lar-focused, top-down approach will not work. 206 Instead boxing 
the nuclear industry into an all-or-nothing plan, the United 
States' SNF policy should take a flexible, iterative approach.207 
The Blue Ribbon Commission has identified the need for this 
change,208 but in order to implement it there must be a significant 
bipartisan political effort coupled with a focus on sound science. 
The United States cannot afford to keep ignoring its nuclear 
waste problem. Regardless of individual opinions about the wis-
dom of nuclear power, SNF is here to stay. 209 The United States 
should move towards a solution by adopting a multidimensional 
approach including reprocessing, consolidated interim storage, 
and eventual permanent SNF disposal. 
Christopher M Keegan * 
205. See Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 47. 
206. See id. at 78-79 ("NWPA imposed a blueprint for Yucca that defined the key ele-
ments of the repository project at the outset and prescribed a rigid timetable for imple-
mentation."). 
207. See id. (discussing how the Waste Isolation Pilot Program in New Mexico was suc-
cessful because it involved a flexible iterative process). 
208. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 31 ("Flexibil-
ity ... is needed because implementing a disposal program will take at least several gen-
erations, during which technology and values are sure to evolve .... "). 
209. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Richmond School of Law. M.E.M., 2013, Old 
Dominion University; B.S., 2007, United States Naval Academy. I must express my ex-
treme gratitude to Casey, for years of listening to me talk about nuclear power. Thank 
you also to the University of Richmond Law Review's editors and staff whose tireless and 
thankless work has made this comment possible. 
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